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Abstract

This article reviews the development of Japanese energy policy since March 2011. The
catastrophe at Fukushima Daiichi that month resulted in the loss or eventual shutdown of all of
Japan’s substantial nuclear generating capacity. It also undermined the long-term energy plan
adopted just nine months earlier, in June 2010, which had called for a significant increase in the
nuclear contribution to Japan’s energy mix. During the next several years, successive Japanese
governments took a number of steps to compensate for the loss of nuclear power by reducing
electricity consumption and increasing the supply of electricity from other sources, while laying
the groundwork for the eventual resumption of operations at Japan’s existing nuclear power
plants. The governments also labored to develop a new long-term energy plan that would take
into account the new realities. These efforts did not result in a new plan until April 2014,
however, and even that document left important questions about the future role of nuclear power
unanswered, reflecting continuing deep divisions within Japanese society over the appropriate
place of nuclear power in Japan’s energy mix.
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Japanese Energy Policy after Fukushima Daiichi:
Nuclear Ambivalence

The tragic events of March 11, 2011 dealt a major blow to Japanese energy policy. Just the
previous June, the government had adopted a new long-term energy plan that called for a
substantial increase in Japan’s reliance on nuclear power over the next two decades. Then the
catastrophe at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station resulted in the immediate destruction
or shutdown of 10 reactors and cast into doubt the entire future of nuclear power in Japan.
Successive Japanese governments struggled to deal with the consequences. The first
order of business was to make up for the sudden loss of so much nuclear-generated electricity, a
problem that was compounded over the next 14 months as the nuclear power plants still in
operation successively went off-line. But an equally important, if less urgent, task was to
develop a new long-term vision for Japanese energy policy, especially concerning the role that
nuclear power would play.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the process of developing a new long-term energy plan proved
to be extremely difficult. It took more than four years to adopt a new plan and work out the
details, and even then, Japanese society seemed no closer to reaching a workable consensus on
the issue of nuclear power than it had immediately following the nuclear accident. To the
contrary, it remained deeply divided, with groups on both sides of the issue marshalling
arguments in support of their competing policy preferences.
This article reviews the evolution of Japanese energy policy after March 2011. It
describes the steps that were taken to meet Japan’s immediate energy needs as well as the
attempts to develop a new long-term policy, first under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),
which was in power at the time of the accident, and then under the Liberal Democratic Party
3

(LDP), which took office in late 2012. It also seeks to shed light on the challenges faced by
Japanese policy makers of both parties as they sought to fashion the new policy.1

Japanese Energy Policy before 3.11
In June 2010, the Japanese government adopted a new triennial Strategic Energy Plan (SEP), as
called for under the 2002 Basic Act on Energy Policy.2 The plan established targets for energy
consumption and production out to the year 2030. On the demand side, it called for cutting
Japan’s primary energy consumption (PEC) by some 13 percent below the 2007 level and by
some 18 percent below business-as-usual (BAU) projections for 2030. The amount of electric
power generated by the 10 regional utilities would decline slightly from the current level, from
about 1020 to 970 terawatt hours (TWh), but would fall 25 percent below BAU projections.
At the same time, significant changes would occur in Japan’s energy mix under the plan.
The share of PEC provided by fossil fuels would drop from 84 percent to 64 percent, with the
biggest cuts coming in oil (from 41 to 28 percent) and coal (from 22 to 17 percent). Fossil fuels
would be replaced by nuclear power (from 10 to 24 percent) and renewables (from six to 13
percent).
The change in the electricity mix would be even more striking. The shares of electricity
provided by renewable sources and nuclear power would rise from eight to 19 percent and from
26 to some 53 percent, respectively. Fossil fuels would account for only a quarter of electric
power generation, down from two-thirds in 2007, as a principal element of the strategy for
reducing Japan’s CO2 emissions.
To achieve these targets, Japan would need to realize a dramatic expansion in particular
in its renewable energy generating capacity, from about 50 to 120 gigawatts (GW), a figure
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equivalent to nearly 45 percent of Japan’s total generating capacity in 2010. And because the
potential for expanding hydroelectric power was quite limited, much of the capacity growth
would have to come in the form of wind power (from 2.4 to 10 GW) and, especially, solar
photovoltaic (PV) power (from 3.6 to 53 GW).3
The projected growth in nuclear generating capacity would not be so dramatic, but was
still significant, from about 50 to 68 GW, or a nearly 40 percent increase. To achieve this
target, Japan would have to build 14 new reactors, to supplement the 54 already in existence. In
addition, the existing reactors, some of which dated to the early 1970s, would have to receive
lifetime extensions beyond the original 40 years, and the plan assumed that all reactors could be
operated 90 percent of the time on average, well above historic levels of capacity utilization in
Japan.4
Even before the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi, it was clear that achieving these targets
for nuclear power and renewables would not be easy. Experts questioned the ability of the
existing power system to accommodate enough PV generating capacity to provide more than six
to eight percent of the electricity supply. Many of the most productive sites for wind power,
moreover, tended to be located far from where electricity was used, necessitating new power
lines often in the face of local opposition. And the intermittent nature of both wind and solar
power would require the maintenance of substantial backup fossil fuel generating capacity in the
absence of large scale electric storage capacity.5
Equally strong doubts accompanied the plans for increasing nuclear power’s contribution
to meeting Japan’s energy needs. The goal of 14 new reactors was feasible, but the construction
of reactors had slowed greatly in the previous decade because of safety concerns and local
opposition. Actual and potential opposition to new nuclear power plants, which could result in
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long delays, had in turn made the utilities reluctant to invest heavily in them, given the high costs
of construction. Likewise, the lifetime extensions of aging reactors, which were equally critical
to the success of the plan, would probably depend on overcoming the anxieties generated by a
series of recent mishaps and scandals involving nuclear power plants. Finally, a 90 percent
operating capacity was not out of the question; similar or higher levels had been achieved in the
United States and South Korea. But for many years, 80 percent had been the norm in Japan
because of its shorter operation cycles between routine inspections and longer outage times for
maintenance and repairs, and capacity utilization had fallen below 70 percent during the previous
five years because of a series of unplanned outages, including a 2007 earthquake that temporarily
shut down seven reactors.6

Impact of 3.11 on Japan’s Energy Supply
The earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011, resulted in the loss of about 30 GW of
electricity generating capacity, or about 17.3 percent of Japan’s total capacity at the time. But
many of the affected fossil fuel and hydroelectric power stations were quickly restored to
operation.7 Instead, by far the biggest blow to Japan’s energy supply on that tragic day was
delivered to its nuclear power plants.
At the time, approximately one-third of the 54 reactors were shut down for inspection,
maintenance, or repairs, including three of the six reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi power
station. As a result of the earthquake and tsunami, 10 more reactors located along the northeast
coast of Japan were immediately shut down. Among these were the three operating reactors at
Fukushima Daiichi, all of which subsequently experienced meltdowns. This left just two dozen
or so reactors in operation.8
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Because of safety concerns, the government did not allow temporarily idled reactors to
restart, and over the next 14 months, the remaining reactors were all shut down. In May 2011,
the government asked the third largest regional power company, Chubu, to shut down two
operating units because of concerns about their vulnerability to future earthquakes and tsunamis.
Other reactors reached the point after 13 months of operation, when they were required to stop
for routine inspection and maintenance. Thus in May 2012, the last operating reactor turned
off.9
To be sure, the government was reluctant to see Japan lose an important domestic source
of power, but it would not allow any reactors to restart without the support of local leaders, and
many of the latter were opposed. In an attempt to reassure the public, the government decided
in July 2011 that reactors would have to undergo stress tests before they could be restarted. But
even then, the influential governor of Niigata prefecture, home to the single largest nuclear
power station in Japan, announced that he would still not approve restarts.10
The government’s ambivalence was understandable. The loss of so much base load
generating capacity threatened to cause blackouts in parts of the country, especially during peak
summer demand periods. Compounding the problem was the limited number of high voltage
power lines linking the regional power companies, a constraint that was exacerbated by the fact
that the eastern and western halves of the country operate on different frequencies. As a result,
a maximum of 1 GW of power, or the equivalent of just one nuclear reactor’s output, could be
transferred in either direction.11
The situation was most acute in the Tokyo and Kansai regions. Indeed, the latter had
depended on nuclear power for half of its electricity, much higher than the national average of
25-30 percent, which made that region particularly vulnerable to blackouts. Thus in his first
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policy speech in August 2011, the new DPJ prime minister Yoshihiko Noda called for restarting
reactors that passed the stress tests even as nuclear power was phased out in the long term. And
the following July, after two of the reactors at the Ohi nuclear power plant in the Kansai region
had successfully completed the stress tests and under strong central government pressure, the
local and prefectural governments reluctantly approved restarting them.12

Responses to the Loss of Nuclear Power Generation
During the next several years, the government made a number of efforts to cope with the sudden
loss of nuclear power. Some of these focused on reducing power demand while others
concerned increasing the supply of electricity, in part by restructuring the electric power system.
The government also took steps to lay the groundwork for the eventual resumption of operations
at Japan’s existing nuclear power plants.

Measures to Reduce Electricity Demand
The most immediate energy policy challenge faced by the government beyond dealing with the
dangers at Fukushima Daiichi was how to address the potential threat of blackouts. Because of
the loss of so many nuclear reactors, the available generating capacity was likely to fall well
short of the amount needed to meet previous summer demand peaks. As a first step, the
government established goals for cutting power consumption in 2011, including mandatory
restrictions on large users, in the most vulnerable areas for the period from July to September. It
set a target of reducing use by at least 15 percent below the 2010 peak in the Tokyo and Tohoku
regions and by ten percent in the Kansai region, and it mounted an aggressive power saving
campaign.13
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The government had to assume that the challenge would only grow in magnitude as
additional nuclear reactors went off line. Thus in August 2011, the cabinet adopted a list of
“Immediate Supply-Demand Stabilization Measures,” which set out a three-year timetable for
implementing almost 50 specific actions intended to address the problem. The overall goal was
to minimize the risk of power shortages at peak hours while holding down the price of electricity
even in the event of a complete loss of nuclear power and without imposing any further
obligatory savings measures.14
In order to reduce electricity demand over the longer term, the government also decided
to revise the Energy Conservation Law, which dated to the second oil shock in 1979. In March
2012, the DPJ government approved amendments developed by the Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy (ANRE) within the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).
These changes emphasized measures to curb peak electricity demand by using storage batteries,
energy management systems, or private power generation and to improve the energy efficiency
of building materials. Because of the change in government later that year, the amendments were
not passed by the Diet until May 2013, and some observers were skeptical of how much
difference in energy consumption the new measures would actually make. In 2015, however,
the government enacted a far-reaching bill intended to promote energy savings in buildings.15

Measures to Increase Other Sources of Electricity Supply
At the same time, the government and the utilities worked to increase the supply of electricity
from other sources. The most immediately available options were to take advantage of
underutilized or mothballed thermal generating plants that use fossil fuels and to build new ones.
The government relaxed some restrictions and even offered financial incentives for self-
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generation of electricity. As a result, the share of power generated from natural gas jumped
dramatically, from 30 to around 45 percent, as the utilization rate of gas-fired power stations
went from just half to nearly 100 percent.16
The government also took steps to accelerate the introduction of renewable sources of
power. In fact, it was already developing a comprehensive feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme, which
was approved by the cabinet on the morning of March 11, 2011, just hours before the
earthquake. Up to that point, the measure had been intended to reduce fossil fuel-fired power
generation, but it provided a ready vehicle for addressing the new exigencies, and following the
disaster, the text was revised to offer more generous incentives before being approved by the
Diet in August 2011.17
The original tariff levels, set in April 2012, were particularly favorable to the installation
of solar PV, which would receive up to 42 yen per kilowatt hour (kWh) for as many as 20 years,
depending on the size of the installation. As a result, more than 90 percent of the applications
were for solar PV, and by April 2013, the end of the first year of operation, the government had
approved almost 19 GW of new PV capacity. In fact, the response was so strong that the rate
setting commission recommended reducing the tariff beginning that month to no more than 38
yen/kWh, a level that reflected the dramatic decline that had occurred in the cost of solar panels.
Even then, another 46 GW of capacity was licensed during the following 12 months, with the
majority of applications been submitted in March 2014 just before the guaranteed purchase price
was again reduced, to only 32 yen/kWh for non-household producers. Actual installed capacity,
however, grew much more slowly, reaching just nine GW by April 2014, and it appeared that
some successful license applicants were waiting for prices to fall even more before building the
approved projects.18
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Less favorable tariffs were not the only reason that the growth in other renewable sources
of power lagged solar PV. A 2011 Ministry of the Environment study had found that, of all the
possible renewable sources, wind power had by far the greatest potential in Japan. But wind
farms had to pass more complex environmental impact assessments, and some two-thirds of the
most promising onshore areas were located in the very north of the country, where they
threatened to overwhelm the local grids in the absence of better interregional connections.19
And as early as mid-2013, even the incorporation of new PV capacity was beginning to
face challenges, as some power grids were reportedly already reaching their capacity to absorb
renewable sources. The most acute situation arose on Hokkaido, where the availability of large
amounts of inexpensive, undeveloped land made solar power particularly attractive. Limited
demand and interconnections with other regions, however, prompted the regional power
monopoly to limit purchases from large solar power installations to 400 MW, or just one-quarter
of the amount of capacity applied for. And the problem was not confined to the north; power
grids in southern Japan were also close to their limits, after accounting for existing and approved
renewable capacity. More fundamentally, Japan lacked clear regulations defining grid access
for renewables, including purchase volumes and costs, leaving decisions on such critical matters
largely to the discretion of the utilities.20
The issue came to a head in the fall of 2014, when five of the 10 regional utilities
suspended the review of applications for connecting new renewable capacity to the grid in the
face of concerns about oversupply and network instability. The situation was particularly acute
in southwestern Kyushu, where the amount of solar power capacity certified under the FIT –
nearly a quarter of the national total – already exceeded peak demand. METI responded by
establishing a working group to determine a formula for calculating the amount of renewable
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power that the grid could accommodate. In early 2015, ANRE promulgated a revision of the
FIT scheme that would set deadlines for constructing approved renewable projects, allow utilities
to limit the output of renewable-generated electricity on an hourly basis in order to maintain the
balance between supply and demand, and expand the scope of such curtailment to include
facilities smaller than 500 kilowatts. Although the changes were justified as necessary to allow
the connection of additional solar capacity, some critics alleged that the real purpose of the
reforms was to limit the amount of renewable energy on the grid in order to ensure its ability to
accommodate electricity from nuclear power plants once they returned to service. And in
March, the government announced further reductions in the solar PV tariff, which would drop in
July to 27 yet/kWh for projects of more than 10 kilowatts.21

Reform of the Electric Power System
The challenges facing the take-up of renewable power sources also helped to maintain pressure
for a sweeping reform of the entire electric power system. The crisis at Fukushima Daiichi had
already revealed several serious limitations, including the capacity to transmit power between the
regional networks, the ability to handle changes in the energy mix, especially an increase in
intermittent sources, and the choice of tariffs for many customers. These limitations in turn
prompted calls for fundamental changes in the electric power system, including the creation of a
nation-wide transmission system, the unbundling of transmission and distribution from
generation and retailing, and full competition in generation and retail sales.22
The DPJ government decided to pursue systematic reform of the electric power system in
December 2011 and established a task force and then an expert committee to study the problem.
By May 2012, the government was able to issue an outline of its overall plan, although many
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details remained to be worked out. On the demand side, it called for the full opening of the
retail market through the abolition of regional monopolies along with the supply obligations and
rate regulations previously imposed on the utilities. On the supply side, it called for the full
liberalization of power generation and the revitalization of wholesale power exchange markets.
And it called for the creation of a national grid operator to coordinate transmission and
distribution across supply areas and the assurance of grid neutrality through either functional or
legal unbundling.23
In February 2013, the expert committee presented a final report, which called for full
liberalization of the retail electricity market and legal unbundling of transmission and
distribution. The report was subsequently adopted in April of that year by the new LDPdominated cabinet, which established three goals: ensuring a stable power supply, keeping
electricity rates as low as possible, and expanding user choice and business opportunities. The
final plan called for carrying out the reforms in three phases. In the first phase, to be completed
in 2015, the government would establish a new entity to operate a nation-wide grid system. In
the second, to be completed by 2016, it would liberalize the choice of electricity suppliers for all
customers, and establish a new framework for securing adequate supply capacity. And in the
third, to be completed during the 2018-2020 timeframe, the government would carry out the
divestiture of the transmission and distribution assets of the regional utilities and abolish any
remaining price restrictions.24
Rather than try to implement all the reforms at once, however, the LDP-led government
decided to divide the proposal into three separate legislative packages, corresponding to the three
phases. The packages would be introduced over three years, with the first being sent to the Diet
in 2013. This piecemeal approach raised concerns among some observers that it would provide
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opportunities for the regional monopolies to water down the final legislation.25
Nevertheless, through 2015, the reform process appeared to be on track. The Diet had
enacted the first promised piece of legislation in November 2013, the second in June 2014, and
the third in June 2015. The new national grid management agency, the Organization for Crossregional Coordination of Transmission Operators (OCCTO), was established in 2015, and
preparations were underway for the introduction of full retail competition the following year.
Indeed, hundreds of companies had already applied for approval to sell electricity. Even the
most contentious element of the package -- the legal unbundling of the regional transmission and
distribution systems from the power generation and retail functions – had been approved,
although it would not go into effect until the latest possible date, and some observers questioned
whether the government would be willing and able to prevent the expected efforts of the utilities
to dilute this reform effort.26

Efforts to Improve Nuclear Safety
A final major thrust of Japanese energy policy after March 2011 was to overhaul the institutions
and regulations for ensuring the safety of Japan’s nuclear power industry. There was
widespread belief, subsequently confirmed by several detailed investigations, that lax oversight
had contributed to the circumstances leading to the explosions and meltdowns at Fukushima
Daiichi, which might even have been avoided. At a minimum, the safety regime would have to
be fundamentally reformed if the government and the utilities were ever to regain the trust of the
populace and restart the shuttered reactors.
As a first step, the DPJ government called for a clear separation of the functions of
nuclear regulation and promotion. For some years prior to the accident, the principal regulatory
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body, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), had been housed within METI, which
was responsible for promoting the nuclear industry, creating a conflict of interest. Then, in
January 2012, the government announced that it would create a new nuclear safety agency under
the Ministry of the Environment (MOE). It also proposed a number of amendments to the
Atomic Energy Basic Act and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law, subsequently adopted, that
would, among other things, impose a 40-year cap on the operational lives of nuclear power
plants, subject to a single extension of not more than 20 years, require utilities to retrofit existing
plants with the latest safety features, and make accident management preparations obligatory.27
In September 2012, the new Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) came into existence.
Although nominally part of the MOE, it was established as a legally independent agency without
control or supervision by any superior body. Nevertheless, concerns were quickly raised about
whether the new body would be free of the “culture of complacency” and “willful ignorance”
that had allegedly permeated the regulatory environment. After all, a high percentage of the
staff came from the former, now discredited, regulatory bodies, and even the first chairman had
served as president of the Atomic Energy Society, which advocates the use of nuclear energy.
But some additional measures were taken to prevent conflicts of interest and avoid regulatory
capture in the future, such as locating the authority outside the government district and
forbidding the transfer of senior officials to any government organization under the NRA’s
jurisdiction.28
The new NRA quickly went to work. In October 2012, it began a series of
investigations of nuclear power plants located in areas suspected of being seismically active, and
it established guidelines for nuclear emergency preparedness that local authorities were to
implement by March 2013.29 But its most important order of business was to draw up a new
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comprehensive set of strong safety regulations that all power plants would have to meet.
A first draft of the regulations was issued in February 2013 and contained both measures
to prevent future accidents and countermeasures for mitigating the impact of an accident if one
nevertheless occurred. Among other things, they called for stronger tsunami defenses,
alternative power supplies, multiple sources of cooling water, filtered vents, backup control
rooms and emergency command centers, and methods of injecting water into a molten core that
had already left the reactor vessel. In addition, the proposed regulations limited nuclear reactors
to a service life of 40 years [takahashi, 71] Following a period for public comment and a set of
hearings, the regulations were finalized and went into effect in July 2013.30
Four power companies quickly submitted applications to restart a total 12 reactors at six
different sites (another dozen were submitted over the following two years). It was clear that all
plants would have to make significant safety improvements, ranging in cost from $700 million to
$1 billion per unit, and in some cases, the necessary modifications would be too expensive to be
worthwhile. In other cases, however, it appeared that the required investments would not be an
obstacle to reopening the plants, and given the high cost of fossil fuel, restarting as many as
possible was the top priority of the power companies.31
Nevertheless, it remained uncertain how quickly the NRA would be able to reach
decisions on the applications. The chairman initially stated that the review period would
normally take about six months and that, given the urgency of the situation, the process would be
expedited as much as possible. But the process turned out to be much slower, for several
reasons. First, the NRA was inclined to proceed cautiously, especially as it sought to gain
credibility in the public eye. Moreover, the NRA had only enough experts to evaluate several
sites at a time.32
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Thus, it was not until September 2014 that the NRA determined that two reactors at the
Sendai nuclear power station in far southwest Japan met the new safety requirements and then
five months later two units at the more centrally located Takahama power plant. The restart of
the Sendai reactors was soon approved by the governments of Kagoshima prefecture and the
local community in which they are located. And after a final round of inspections, they resumed
operation in August and October 2015, respectively.33
The situation at Takahama, located in Fukui prefecture, was more problematic.
Although the host municipality and prefectural government were favorably disposed to a restart,
parts of other populous prefectures and municipalities were located within the expanded 30
kilometer evacuation zone around the power plant, and their governments insisted on having a
say in the matter, citing the potential risk to their citizens, and in April 2015 obtained a
provisional injunction from the prefectural court against restarting the reactors that was not lifted
until the very end of the year. Japanese law and policy remained unclear as to which bodies
should be involved in restart decisions. Although it was generally agreed that local consent was
a requirement, uncertainty remained over which localities should be included.
Even as the NRA was issuing the first safety approvals – a fifth was issued in July 2015
for a reactor at the Ikata nuclear power plant, moreover, the NRA concluded that a reactor at the
Tsuruga nuclear power plant stood on top of an active fault. And in March 2015, four power
companies announced the decommissioning of five older reactors, leaving just 43 potentially
operational units. Thus at the end of 2015, nearly five years after the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear accident, only two of Japan’s reactors were back in operation, and as few as another five
to seven were expected to restart over the next several years.34
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Broader Implications of 3.11
Despite these efforts to improve nuclear safety, the major premise on which Japanese energy
policy had been based – that nuclear power was fundamentally safe – had been profoundly
undermined by the Fukushima disaster. As a result, the degree to which Japan would rely on
nuclear power in the future came under fundamental review. In May 2011, less than a year after
the adoption of the most recent Strategic Energy Plan, the government announced that “There is
no alternative but to start from scratch on a new national energy plan.”35 There seemed to be
general agreement that Japan should reduce its planned dependence on nuclear power, but a
number of consequential questions would still have to be answered: how much should Japan cut
its nuclear reliance? How quickly should the reductions be implemented? What alternatives
should Japan rely on to meet its electricity needs? And how much was the country willing to
pay in terms of economic, social, and environmental costs?
Efforts to answer to these questions went through in two phases. During the period
ending in September 2012, the DPJ government came close to, but stopped short of, adopting a
new energy plan that called for phasing out nuclear power by the end of the 2030s but continuing
to rely on it in the meantime and that set concrete targets for total electricity consumption and the
contribution from different power sources. The new LDP-led government, which took office in
December 2012, adopted a different approach, seeking to avoid establishing specific long-term
targets for Japan’s energy mix. This intentional ambiguity culminated in April 2014 with the
government’s adoption of a new Strategic Energy Plan that left these questions largely
unanswered, and even the preparation of a long-term energy supply and demand outlook the
following year was silent on critical issues.
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Development of a New Strategic Energy Plan: The DPJ
Shortly after the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi, then DPJ prime minister Naoto Kan initially
signaled a willingness to maintain a significant degree of reliance on nuclear power once the
safety of the existing facilities was assured. In July 2011, however, following the revelation that
a public forum on nuclear safety measures had been rigged by METI and the regional power
company, he reversed course and declared that Japan should gradually reduce its nuclear
dependence, eventually to the point where it could do without nuclear power altogether. His
successor in September 2011, Yoshihiko Noda, was more ambivalent, limiting his position to
reducing Japan’s nuclear dependence as much as possible in the medium- to long-term, although
he opposed building new reactors and extending the operating licenses of existing ones, and it
was this more ambiguous position that was initially adopted by the DPJ government.36

The Process of Developing a New Plan
As a first step in developing a new national energy plan, the cabinet established in June 2011 a
new interministerial Energy and Environment Council (EEC), which was tasked with
formulating an “Innovative Energy and Environment Strategy.” The EEC was chaired by the
Minister of National Policy and included seven other cabinet members, including the METI and
MOE ministers as co-chairs. The EEC quickly adopted three guiding philosophies: reducing
dependence on nuclear energy while avoiding energy shortages and price hikes, shifting to
distributed energy systems, and holding national discussions. And based on these guidelines, it
requested that the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, METI’s Advisory Committee on Natural
Resources and Energy (ACNRE), and MOE’s Central Environmental Council prepare options
for the nation’s nuclear policies, energy mix, and measures to prevent global warming,
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respectively. It also created an independent committee within the National Policy Office Unit to
develop independent estimates of the costs of alternative means of power generation.37
Most of the subsequent discussions regarding Japan’s future energy mix took place
within the Fundamental Issues Subcommittee (FIS) of the ACNRE. The subcommittee initially
had 17 members, only two of whom were viewed as opponents of nuclear power. This
composition was roundly criticized by outside groups, and the membership was expanded to 25,
including eight nuclear critics and an equal number of nuclear proponents.38
Starting in October 2011, the subcommittee met approximately weekly. Despite the
internal tensions, the members were able to agree the following December on four “basic
directions” for future discussions: 1) fundamental reinforcement of energy and electricity
conservation, 2) accelerated development and use of renewable energies to the maximum degree
possible, 3) effective utilization of fossil fuels, beginning with a shift to natural gas, and 4)
reduced dependency on nuclear power wherever possible.39
Meanwhile, the cost investigation committee also issued its report that December.
Taking into account the full costs of nuclear power, it arrived at an estimate that was 50 percent
higher than the most recent official estimate, or 8.9 yen/kWh versus 5.9 yen/kWh. Thus, the
cost difference between nuclear and alternative sources of power would be smaller, especially in
the medium to long term, than previously thought.40
In late June 2012, the EEC summarized the discussions of the various committees and
presented three scenarios for the year 2030, reflecting the wide range of views held by committee
members. All three scenarios involved a significant reduction in Japan’s planned reliance on
nuclear power, but the projected share of electricity generated in nuclear plants ranged from zero
to 15 to 25 percent, well below the roughly 50 percent contained in the 2010 Strategic Energy
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Plan. Nuclear power would be replaced by some combination of renewable power sources and
fossil fuels, with the former ranging from 25 to 35 percent, depending on the scenario, versus the
20 percent contained in the 2010 plan. To help make these targets possible, conservation efforts
would reduce electricity demand by nearly 20 percent below the previous projection. In all
three scenarios, however, the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below the base year of 1990
would be significantly less than the 30 percent previously anticipated, and all would result in
higher electricity bills and some reduction in projected GDP, although the estimates varied
widely.41

The Innovative Strategy for Energy and Environment
Following the presentation of the three scenarios, the EEC initiated a national discussion of the
options, which lasted through mid-August of 2012. It held public hearings in 11 different cities
that drew about 1000 people. It invited public comments, of which it received about 90,000.
And it conducted deliberate polling and small group discussions in which some 300 people
participated. A substantial majority of the responses favored the zero or 15 percent options for
nuclear energy, reflecting widespread public doubts about the safety of nuclear reactors at a time
when demonstrations in Tokyo were drawing hundreds of thousands.42
Some elements of Japanese society were highly critical of the report. For example, the
Japanese Business Association (Keidanren), the leading voice of big business in Japan, issued a
sharp critique of all three scenarios. It argued that the assumptions about economic growth on
which they were based were inconsistent with the government’s own policy and that those about
energy conservation and renewable sources of power were unrealistic. It feared that electricity
prices would increase significantly, with negative consequences for the economy.43 Other
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groups, especially environmental NGOs that favored a complete nuclear phase out, felt that the
scenarios were not truly sustainable and did not go far enough to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.44
Following this period of discussion and feedback, the EEC prepared and issued a final set
of recommendations, called the Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment (ISEE), on
September 14, 2012.45 The overall goal of the strategy was to reduce dependence on nuclear
energy as well as on fossil fuels by maximizing energy efficiency and renewable energy. The
strategy contained three main pillars: realization of a society not dependent on nuclear power,
realization of a green energy revolution, and ensuring a stable supply of energy.
Under the first pillar, the government would “mobilize all possible policy resources to
such a level as to even enable zero operation of nuclear power in the 2030’s” [sic]. In
particular, rules limiting reactor operating lifetimes to 40 years would be strictly applied, and no
new nuclear power plants would be planned. At the same time, however, existing power plants
would be restarted “as an important power source” once the NRA had assured their safety.
Under the second pillar, Japan would reduce its annual electricity consumption by up to
10 percent, to as little as 1000 TWh, and total final energy consumption by as much as 19
percent by 2030, depending on the rate of economic growth, and the strategy outlined a number
of measures for achieving these reductions. In addition, the amount of renewable electricity
would nearly triple, from 110 TWh in 2010 to 300 TWh in 2030, with most of the gains coming
from solar and wind power. Achieving this goal would require increasing the amount of
installed renewable capacity other than hydropower from nine GW to 108 GW.
Under the third pillar, Japan would increase the contribution of co-generation from 30
TWh to 150 TWh, or 15 percent of electricity production in 2030. It would also take advantage
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of advanced technology to generate power from fossil fuels as efficiently and with as little
environmental impact as possible.
Finally, the strategy noted that the achievement of these pillars would be facilitated by a
fundamental reform of the electric power system, which the DPJ government had already
decided to pursue, and it indicated the government’s intention to present a detailed restructuring
plan by the end of the year. It also discussed the strategy’s impact on greenhouse gas emissions
and what other steps the government would take to prevent global warming, since energy-related
emission cuts under the ISEE would fall short, and possibly well short, of the targets previously
set for 2020 and 2030.
Overall, the strategy appeared to combine elements of the 0 percent and 15 percent
scenarios that the EEC had presented in June. The targets for electricity savings and renewable
power were consistent with both scenarios. Although nuclear power would presumably
continue to make an unspecified contribution to meeting Japan’s electricity needs in 2030, it
would be phased out by the end of the following decade.

The Demise of the Innovative Strategy
Prime minister Noda welcomed the ISEE and even seemed to endorse it.46 But the cabinet
immediately came under pressure not to adopt the strategy as government policy. Business and
industry in particular expressed concerns about and lobbied against the plan to phase out nuclear
power. They argued that implementing the strategy would cause an unacceptable increase in
electricity prices, make Japanese industry uncompetitive, result in a hollowing out of the
Japanese economy, boost unemployment, threaten the financial viability of the electric utilities,
and make it impossible for Japan to maintain its prowess in nuclear technology. Instead, they
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demanded an alternative and, in their view, more realistic plan that would contain a continuing
significant role for nuclear power in Japan’s energy mix.47
Additional pressure came from abroad. In particular, the U.S. government reportedly
demanded that the cabinet take no definitive decision to phase out nuclear power. Washington
was eager to see Japan restart its reactors so it could use up reprocessed spent fuel. Japan’s
failure to do so would undermine the U.S. position on nuclear non-proliferation, since it would
allow Japan to acquire substantial amounts of plutonium without any obvious commercial use.48
In the face of this tsunami of criticism, DPJ leaders quickly began to hedge their
positions. They suggested that some reactors might be allowed to operate for more than 40
years after all. They indicated that they would not necessarily block work on reactors that were
already under construction. Thus nuclear power might in fact continue to be part of the energy
mix well beyond the 2030s.49
The government’s backtracking culminated on September 19, when the cabinet met to
consider the ISEE. Rather than adopting the strategy, it issued the following statement:
The Government of Japan will implement future policies on energy and the environment,
taking into account of “the Innovative Strategy on Energy and the Environment,” while
having discussions in a responsible manner with related local governments, the
international community and others, and obtaining understanding of the Japanese public,
by constantly reviewing and reexamining policies with flexibility.50
Thus the ISEE was left in limbo and work on the development of a new energy plan was
suspended, pending the outcome of the national elections now scheduled for December.51

Development of a New Strategic Energy Plan: The LDP
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The fate of ISEE was sealed with the victory of the opposition LDP in the lower house elections
of December 2012. Although the LDP leader, Shinzo Abe, had voiced his support for nuclear
power, the party had said very little during the campaign about how it would address Japan’s
energy challenges, preferring to emphasize other issues. Discussion in the LDP’s election
manifesto was largely limited to stating that the party would seek to establish the best energy mix
within 10 years.52
Then, in early 2013, Abe, the new prime minister, announced that the government would
conduct a review of the ISEE from the ground up. The goal would be to formulate a responsible
energy policy aimed at ensuring a stable supply of energy and lower energy costs.53
In many respects, the initial positions expressed the LDP were very similar to those of the
DPJ. The government would seek to restart existing plants, but only where their safety had been
confirmed by the NRA. It would promote the introduction of energy conservation and
renewable energies to the greatest possible extent in order to reduce Japan’s dependence on
nuclear power as much as possible. And it would begin a fundamental reform of the electric
power system.54
In other respects, however, it appeared that the new government preferred a greater role
for nuclear power. It hoped to extend reactor lifetimes to 50 years, although this too would
require approval by the NRA. It hoped to build new reactors, which would, in the words of
Abe, “be totally different from the ones built 40 years ago..." And it would make greater efforts
to persuade local governments to restart nuclear power plants, once the NRA gave the green
light.55

The Process of Developing a New Plan
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This time, responsibility for developing a new energy plan was turned over to a subcommittee of
METI’s Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy. The membership of the new
General Subcommittee, moreover, was reduced to just 15 people, and only two of the members
were regarding as holding critical views of nuclear power. The interministerial EEC, which had
previously coordinated the effort, was disbanded.56
The General Subcommittee held its first meeting in March 2013. The initial goal was to
develop a new plan by the end of the year. In contrast to the previous Strategic Energy Plan and
the ISEE, however, there was no intention of establishing concrete targets for the contribution of
each type of energy to Japan’s energy mix, reflecting the uncertainty of predicting how many of
the nuclear reactors would restart.57
The discussions proceeded slowly at first, as the subcommittee met just once a month.
In July, it was renamed the Basic Policy Subcommittee, and the pace quickened, with multiple
meetings in September and October. As the months passed, moreover, the proceedings became
more heated, especially when the subject turned to the future of nuclear policy. Likewise,
testimony by business and consumer groups evidenced deep splits over the issues of restarting
nuclear reactors and the value of the FIT.58
At the same time, deep fissures emerged within the LDP itself. Most notably, the
popular former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi spoke out forcefully in favor of phasing out
nuclear power immediately, reflecting his concern about the lack of a long-term solution for the
disposal of high-level nuclear waste. “Some people say it is irresponsible to call for zero
nuclear plants,” he noted, “but I think it is even more irresponsible not to have a disposal site for
the waste or even any prospect of constructing such a facility.” Restarting reactors would only
result in the production of more dangerous radioactive waste.59
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The Strategic Energy Plan of April 2014
The Basic Policy Subcommittee submitted its final report in December 2013. Because of
divisions within the government, however, it was not until four months later, in April 2014, that
the cabinet was able to adopt a new Strategic Energy Plan, more than three years after the
disaster at Fukushima had undermined the previous one.60
Largely as expected, moreover, the document was long on general principles and short on
specifics. In the much anticipated discussion of each potential energy source, it described
nuclear energy as “an important base-load power source” and affirmed that the government
would “proceed with the restart of the nuclear power plants” as soon as the NRA confirmed that
they conformed to the new safety regulations. Nevertheless, the plan hastened to add that
“Dependency on nuclear power will be lowered to the extent possible through energy saving and
introducing renewable energy as well as improving the efficiency of thermal power plants.”61
In that connection, the government would do as much as possible to promote renewable
energy, and it established a cabinet-level group to that end. The goal was to introduce a slightly
higher level of renewable energy in the electricity supply than had been contained in the previous
SEP, approximately 20 percent or more than 200 TWh. Beyond that, however, the plan was
silent on the details of the future energy mix, as had been expected.62
In that regard, the new SEP was strikingly different from the 2010 plan and the ISEE. It
also differed from the ISEE in terms of its open-ended support of nuclear power. In a number of
other respects, however, the SEP did not go beyond the ISEE. It did not question the previous
plan to limit reactor operating lives to 40 years and to ban new construction. Nor did it call
explicitly for any changes in reactor operating tempos and capacity utilization. And even the
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ISEE had provided for restarting reactors whose safety had been assured by the NRA and
continuing the policy of reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.
Over the following year, one question left unanswered by the new plan, concerning the
future energy mix, was resolved. In January 2015, the government established an advisory
committee to examine the issue. The committee’s report, issued in April, was adopted largely
unmodified in July. Most notably, the report set targets for the nuclear share of electricity
production at 20-22 percent and for renewables at 22-24 percent in 2030.63
The target for nuclear power was significantly lower than that contained in the 2010 plan
and not much greater than that possible under the ISEE. Even then, however, its feasibility was
quickly called into question. Independent experts pointed out that such a figure could not be
achieved without restarting virtually all of the remaining 43 reactors, extending the lifetimes of
many that would otherwise be decommissioned beyond 40 years, and completing the two
reactors that were under construction in 2011. Instead, they argued that a more realistic target
would be nine to 10 percent.64

Explaining Japan’s Nuclear Ambivalence
The difficulty of developing a new long-term energy plan – and the remaining questions
regarding the nuclear program after more than four years of analysis and debate -- reflected the
deep ambivalence within Japanese society over the issue of nuclear power. Although the two
major parties seemed to agree at least on the value of restarting existing nuclear plants once their
safety had been assured by the NRA, they differed on the key question of nuclear energy’s longterm role in meeting Japan’s electricity requirements. And a significant number of rank-and-file
Japanese would not concede the need for any nuclear contribution even in the short term. At the
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risk of oversimplification, the principal actors in the debate could be roughly divided into two
camps.

Pro-Nuclear Arguments
On one side were those who argued for maintaining a substantial role for nuclear power in
Japan’s energy mix for the foreseeable future. They offered three broad sets of arguments in
support of their position.65
First, nuclear power was critical for Japan’s energy security. At home, it enhanced the
stability of Japan’s electricity supply, both by increasing Japan’s overall generating capacity and
by providing a reliable source of base load electricity. Abroad, it reduced Japan’s dependence on
potentially unreliable sources of fossil fuel imports, such as the Middle East and Russia.
The second set of arguments concerned the economic costs and benefits. Without
nuclear power, electricity prices would necessarily be higher, with potentially dire consequences.
Japanese manufacturers would become less competitive, forcing them to move operations
overseas where energy costs were lower and boosting unemployment at home. Fossil fuel
imports would go up, resulting in higher financial outflows and contributing to trade deficits.
Indeed, during the first years after the nuclear accident, fuel costs for the power industry rose by
some 3.6 trillion yen, while electricity prices increased by 25 (for households) to 38 (for
industry) percent.66 And Japan would lose an important source of exports as its nuclear
industry, once among the best in the world, withered. Japan needed to restart its existing
reactors and build new ones if its companies were to compete successfully abroad for nuclear
power contracts.
Third, nuclear power had distinct environmental advantages, especially in the fight
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against climate change. During the first year after the accident at Fukushima, Japan’s overall
greenhouse gas emissions were seven percent higher than before March 2011 largely because of
the increased use of fossil fuels to generate electricity, and CO2 emissions per kilowatt hour in
the power sector increased by nearly 40 percent. And in late 2013, the government announced
that 2020 greenhouse gas emissions would actually be three percent higher than the 1990s level,
assuming that no nuclear reactors were operating, in contrast to the six percent cut promised
under the Kyoto protocol.67
Expressing these pro-nuclear views was a powerful coalition of interest groups. Perhaps
first among these were the influential regional electric power utilities, led by the Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO), and their investors and lenders, who had the most to lose from a
nuclear phase out. The utilities were already spending on the order of $30 billion per year on
additional imports of fossil fuels, which resulted in a combined operating loss of $16 billion in
the 2012-13 fiscal year alone. And they had invested substantially over the years in nuclear
power plants. Thus if all the reactors were permanently closed, the utilities would incur
additional losses of on the order of $56 billion, which would make at least four of them
insolvent.68
Also certain to be hurt would be the companies that built and serviced nuclear power
plants both in Japan and abroad. These include such industry heavyweights as Toshiba,
Mitsubishi, and Hitachi, which have been major players in the global nuclear business.
Although these companies had other lines of work, their bottom lines would surely suffer from a
nuclear phase out.
Not to be overlooked were the many manufacturers that used substantial amounts of
energy and were thus sensitive to energy costs. For these companies, higher prices mean
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reduced competitiveness at home and in world markets. These businesses, along with the
utilities and power plant builders, have often voiced their concerns through the Keidanren, which
was particularly outspoken in the debates over energy policy.69
One other interest group meriting mention consisted of the local communities that have
hosted nuclear facilities and have benefited from substantial financial subsidies over the years.
Between 1990 and 2010, TEPCO alone donated some 40 billion yen to the communities near its
three nuclear power plants on top of the tens of millions of dollars they had already received
from the central government. As a result of such largesse, town budgets and employment
became highly dependent on the continuing presence and operation of nuclear power plants.70

Anti-Nuclear Arguments
Arrayed on the other side of the nuclear issue were those who opposed the restart of any reactors
or argued that Japan should phase out nuclear energy within a reasonable amount of time.
These elements of Japanese society also marshaled powerful arguments in support of their
positions.
Perhaps foremost among these was concern about the safety of the existing nuclear
facilities. The tragedy at Fukushima Daiichi had powerfully demonstrated how dangerous they
could be. Yet even the new, more stringent safety guidelines issued by the NRA were criticized
for placing too much emphasis on hardware fixes, at the expense of worker training and crisis
management skills, and no amount of safety regulation could fully ensure against a recurrence of
regulatory capture or a return of the culture of complacency that had previously reigned in the
so-called “nuclear village,” which brought together pro-nuclear politicians, bureaucrats, and
industry representatives as well as some elements of the media and academics. As a result,
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oversight was lax, enforcement was perfunctory, and regulators often turned a blind eye to
lapses.71 Nor could new rules and procedures compensate for the fact that the geology of Japan
was inherently unstable.
Close behind, and somewhat related, was the concern that Japan still lacked a long-term
solution for the disposal of nuclear waste. Nor did a solution seem likely, for the same
geological reasons that the nuclear reactors were inherently unsafe. To restart the reactors
would only compound the problem by generating yet more nuclear waste.
The arguments on this side were not limited, however, to the dangers and disadvantages
of nuclear power. Some argued that the economic and environmental costs of the nuclear
shutdown had been exaggerated. The rise in fuel costs, for example, had more to do with world
prices. In fact, total natural gas consumption had increased by only 20 percent, while that of oil
and coal remained nearly flat. As for carbon emissions, by 2014 they had nearly returned to
their pre-Fukushima levels.72 Others pointed to the fact that Japan had already weathered
periods of peak demand while obtaining little electricity from nuclear power plants to make the
case that nuclear power was in fact unnecessary to meet Japan’s energy needs. Thanks to
various energy saving measures, overall national electricity consumption was down
approximately five percent, and the most affected areas achieved reductions on the order of 15
percent during peak demand periods. And yet others emphasized the feasibility of quickly
ramping up alternative sources of electricity and the broader economic and environmental
benefits to be had by investing in renewable energy. As noted above, by April 2014, the
government had certified some 65 GW of new solar capacity under the FIT, although the actual
deployment of solar PV was proceeding much more slowly.
These arguments were generally reflected in public opinion polls, which consistently
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showed majorities or pluralities in favor of phasing out nuclear power. Surveys conducted
during the national discussion of the EEC’s three scenarios found 30-40 percent wanting Japan to
be nuclear-free and another 30-40 percent supporting the 15 percent scenario. A February 2013
poll following the LDP electoral victory indicated that 59 percent wanted Japan to abandon
nuclear power by 2040. A May 2013 sounding yielded a similar percentage opposing reactor
restarts. Polls in early 2014 found about two-thirds of respondent against restarts and nearly 80
percent favoring an eventual exit from nuclear power. And a November 2014 survey conducted
after the NRA’s clearance of the Sendai reactors likewise showed twice as many participants
opposing as supporting restarts.73 Particularly strongly opposed were the residents of regions
that were likely suffer the consequences of a future nuclear accident because of their proximity
to power plants but that did not receive the generous subsidies reserved for the actual host
communities.74
At the same time, more and more companies were benefiting from the expansion of
renewables. Perhaps not surprisingly, leaders of new industries, such as Masayoshi Son, the
CEO of the telecommunications giant Softbank, and Hiroshi Mikitani, the president of Japan’s
leading online retailer, became the most outspoken proponents of a shift from nuclear to
renewable sources of power. But even some of the major nuclear vendors were positioning
themselves to take advantage of the business opportunities afforded by the new market.
In closing, it is worth reiterating that these fault lines ran through even the relatively pronuclear post-2012 government. Already noted was former prime minister Koizumi’s prominent
plea against restarting reactors, but he was not the only LDP member to hold that view. And the
LDP was further constrained by its coalition partner, the New Komeito party, whose 2012
election manifesto had called for “optimizing the phase-out of nuclear power and transition to
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renewable energy sources.”75

Conclusion
Following the catastrophic accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the Japanese government took a
number of steps to compensate for the sudden loss of so much nuclear generating capacity. It
promoted conservation measures to reduce electricity demand, especially during peak summer
periods. It encouraged the deployment of alternative generating capacity, introducing a new
feed-in tariff to promote renewable sources of power. It developed and began to implement a
comprehensive program for reforming the electric power system. And it revamped the nuclear
regulatory system in an attempt to ensure that nothing like the events of March 2011 would ever
recur.
More than four years later, however, the future role of nuclear power in Japan’s energy
mix remained uncertain. Even with the adoption of a new Strategic Energy Plan in April 2014,
important questions had yet to be answered. The LDP-led coalition was able to affirm the
importance of nuclear power as a base-load source of electricity and its support for restarting
idled power plants once their safety had been assured by the NRA, but little more. The
establishment of a long-term target for nuclear generated electricity more than a year later did
little to clarify the situation. How many of the reactors would in fact be restarted? Of those
that were, how many would have their operational lives extended beyond 40 years? And would
new reactors be completed or built from scratch?
Strong forces stood on each side of the issue, resulting in policy paralysis. Given the
intensity of the opposition, the strategy of the pro-nuclear interests seemed to be to put off longterm decisions, in the hopes that anti-nuclear sentiment would wane over time in the face of the
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harsh realities of high electricity costs, possible power shortages, and elevated CO2 emissions
from burning more fossil fuels to generate electricity.76
But there was no guarantee that this strategy would succeed. The serious problems
plaguing the cleanup of the Fukushima Daiichi power plant provided a continuing reminder of
the potential pitfalls of reliance on nuclear energy, with seemingly no end in sight. And each
year that went by without blackouts and the steadily rising contribution of renewable sources of
power would serve to strengthen the anti-nuclear arguments.
Even the restart of existing reactors, if only to serve as a bridge to a new, greener energy
future, was plagued by uncertainty. As noted above, the process of approving reactor restarts
was subject to multiple veto points, ranging from the NRA to local communities, and even some
of those reactors that could overcome these hurdles would not be cost-effective to operate, given
the new safety requirements. Thus, although the first shuttered reactors finally began to come
on line -- two in late 2015 with more expected in 2016 -- estimates for the total number that
would eventually be in service varied widely, but generally fell below the government’s
expectation. A 2015 Reuters analysis, for example, concluded that nine reactors were unlikely
to ever restart and that the fate of another 26 was uncertain. A Bloomberg study offered a range
of 12 to 37 restarts, with a medium estimate of 26. And even in the most optimistic restart
scenarios, the number of reactors in operation would soon begin to decline as more and more
reached the end of their 40-year lifespans.77 Whatever role nuclear power might play in the
future, it would certainly be much more circumscribed than it had been in the past.
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